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During the last year, both Communitarianism and private militias have
received a considerable amount of attention in the popular press and in law
reviews; nevertheless, few observers have discussed the similarities between
these two seemingly dissimilar movements. In this Essay, the authors dem-
onstrate that Communitarians and militias actually have more in common
than it might at first appear. Summarizing the Communitarian agenda, the
authors note that Communitarians speak a language that would be readily
understood by the Framers, who saw militias as an important vehicle
through which civic virtue could be transmitted. The importance the Fram-
ers placed upon militias is evidenced by the prominence given to them in the
text of the Constitution and in the Second Amendment.
As the authors point out, however, not only do Communitarians fail to
acknowledge the connection between their ideology and the classical militia,
their platform exhibits a hostility towards the rights guaranteed by the Sec-
ond Amendment that is at odds with Communitarianism's other tenets. The
authors argue that, as traditionally constituted, militias reinforce the same
civic virtues that Communitarianism wishes to restore, while at the same
time offering to individuals security against tyranny. The decline of the clas-
sical militia, say the authors, has led to a renewed interest in the Second
Amendment and even the "neomilitia" movement as people search for some-
thing to fill the void left by the demise of the militia of republican ideology.
That this point is ignored by Communitarians perhaps says something about
Communitarianism that its proponents would rather not acknowledge.
" Associate, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell. B.A., University of the South,
1992; J.D., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1995.
"" Professor of Law, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. B.A., University of Ten-
nessee, Knoxville, 1983; J.D., Yale University, 1986.
The authors are participants in the Internet Firearms Constitutional Law discussion
group moderated by Professor Eugene Volokh of the University of California at Los
Angeles Law School, in which many issues related to this Essay's topic are discussed
and debated. We have benefitted from many comments made there, no doubt sometimes
in ways we are entirely unaware. We also have benefitted from discussions and ex-
changes of manuscripts with a number of individuals, including David Kopel, Sanford
Levinson, David Williams, Scot Powe, William Van Alstyne, Randy Barnett, Don
Kates, and Robert Cottrol.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
"We join with those who read the Second Amendment the way it was
written, as a Communitarian clause, calling for community militias, not
individual gunslingers. "-The Communitarian Platform1
INTRODUCTION
Political discourse in recent years has been dominated by two topics that
seemingly have little in common. One is the growth of a "Communitarian"
movement among scholars; the other is the growth of a "militia movement"
among citizens who, for the most part, are not very scholarly. The two
movements would appear to be incompatible, to say the least.
Communitarians speak and write about the responsibility of government to
foster virtue and responsibility among its citizens;' militia members speak
ominously of the need to resist the encroachment of government. 3 Yet ap-
pearances, in this case at least, are deceptive. As this Essay demonstrates,
there is something of a nexus between the self-styled citizen-soldiers of the
militia movement and the self-styled virtuous citizens of Communitarianism.
Seen as an attractive alternative to the "radical individualism" of our
society, Communitarianism appeals to those on the left' as well as the
right.' Communitarianism is touted as a viable third way between a societal
egocentrism and a more dangerous collectivism.6 Along with interest in
"civic republicanism"7 among legal academics like Frank Michelman, Cass
Sunstein,9 and Mary Ann Glendon,"° Communitarianism promises to medi-
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE
COMMUNITARLAN AGENDA 265 (1993).
2 See id. at 1-11.
See Patricia King, "Vipers" in the 'Burbs, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1996, at 20-23.
4 See, e.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE AND OTHER LES-
SONS CHILDREN TEACH Us (1996).
" See WILLIAM J. BENNETt, THE BOOK OF VIRTUES: A TREASURY OF GREAT MOR-
AL STORIES (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996). See generally Kevin Merida &
Barbara Vobejda, Promoting a Return to "Civil Society," WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1996,
at Al (discussing the ideologically diverse groups promoting Communitarian ideas).
6 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 255-56; SANDEL, supra note 5, at 317-24.
' The revival of civic republicanism is due in large part to historical studies of
colonial ideology done in the 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEO-
LOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); FORREST MCDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
8 See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1986).
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1564
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ate between the desires of the individual and the good of the larger commu-
nity. Communitarians believe that, properly employed, the government not
only can influence moral behavior among its citizens but that it has an obli-
gation to do so." In other words, Communitarians believe that not only can
government legislate morality, but that in many settings it ought to.'2
Contrast such a positive view of government with the often virulent anti-
government rhetoric espoused by many in the so-called "militia move-
ment."' 3 Under scrutiny like never before' 4 -particularly in the wake of
the Oklahoma City bombing case in which the prime suspects have alleged
"links" to militia groups in Michigan' 5-most people now associate militias
with the "angry white male"'6 or with what historian Richard Hofstadter
once referred to as the "paranoid style in American politics."' 7 Not surpris-
ingly, the extravagant claims of various members of these neomilitias8 and
(1988) (arguing for an application of republican ideals to contemporary controversies).
10 See GLENDON, supra note 5, at x-xi.
11 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 11-14.
12 Id. at 31-35.
13 See, e.g., MORRIS DEES, GATHERING STORM: AMERICA'S MILITIA THREAT 4-5
(1996) (describing how hatred of the federal government is driving the militia move-
ment); David Corn, The New Minutemen, THE NATION, May 6, 1996, at 4 (describing
militia members as "paranoid government-haters"); King, supra note 3, at 21-23 (de-
scribing members of Team Viper, a Phoenix militia group, as having "convinced them-
selves that their right to bear arms was in jeopardy and that the Feds were out to get
them").
14 See Christopher John Farley, Patriot Games: Irate, Gun-Toting White Men Are
Forming Militias-Are They Dangerous, or Just Citizens Defending Their Rights?,
TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 48; Richard A. Serrano, Militias: Ranks Are Swelling, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at Al.
15 See Robert D. McFadden, Links in Blast: Armed 'Militia' and a Key Date, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1995, at Al (detailing alleged links of Oklahoma bombing suspects
James Douglas Nichols and Terry Lynn Nichols with the Michigan Militia).
The militia movement also has attracted the attention of Klanwatch and the Anti-
Defamation League, which are both concerned with connections between the new
militias and traditional white supremacist groups. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE RE-
PORT, ARMED AND DANGEROUS: MILITIAS TAKE AIM AT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Nov. 16, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (suggesting adoption
of a uniform Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute); see also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
REPORT, BEYOND THE BOMBING: THE MILITIA MENACE GROWS (June 19, 1995), avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (describing results of national survey sug-
gesting that the militia movement is growing).
16 See Dave Skinner, In Defense of the Militia, USA TODAY (Magazine), July 1,
1996, at 16 (discussing the right to bear arms and maintain a citizens' militia).
17 See Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 3-
41 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (1965).
18 See, e.g., John Branton, Clark County Militia, COLUMBIAN, Nov. 13, 1994, at Al,
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their hostility toward the federal government and its agents 9 have caused
alarm among members of the press2' and among lawmakers.21
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting David Darby, head of the
Clark County, Washington militia, as saying, "The federal government is slowly trying
to take away our Second Amendment, the right to bear arms."); Keith Stone, "Patriot
Movement" Fights Licenses, Taxes, Zip Codes-Government "Tyranny" Expert Esti-
mates that 5 Million Are Believers, Holding that Their Rights Are Being Trampled, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 1994, at 5b, available in 1994 WL 8216539 (discuss-
ing how Patriot Movement "[m]embers mistrust federal government and believe it is
invading their privacy and saddling them with unconstitutional laws, including those
that impose income taxes"); Allan Turner, Militias Willing to Take Up Arms to "Save"
the Constitution, HoUs. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1994, at Al, available in 1994 WL 4605127
(quoting Kyle Norman, lieutenant commander of the Victoria County Constitutional
Militia, who purports to know of a 1961 State Department memo that "details the steps
to replacing the military of sovereign states with a United Nations peacekeeping force"
and who insists that United Nations forces are "all over the place").
"9 See, e.g., Adam Parfrey & Jim Redden, Patriot Games: Linda Thompson, A Gun-
Toting Broad from Indianapolis Wants to Know "Are You Ready for the Next American
Revolution?", VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 11, 1994, at 26 (detailing activities of Linda
Thompson's American Justice Federation); Sam Walker, "Militias" Forming Across
U.S. to Protest Gun Control Laws, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1 (de-
scribing militia groups' denunciation of the Waco assault and the raid on Randy
Weaver's Idaho compound); Tim Weiner, F.B.I. Hunts 2d Bombing Suspect and Seeks
Links to Far Right; Rain Stalls Search of Rubble, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at Al
(linking Oklahoma City bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh to the militia group Arizo-
na Patriots and describing him as having voiced "extreme anger" over the assault by
federal law enforcement agents on the Branch Davidian compound).
20 Several recent books describe in lurid detail the American militia "menace"; see,
e.g., DEES, supra note 13. Dees's organization, the Southern Poverty Law Center, estab-
lished a "Militia Task Force" to combat the perceived militia threat. Dees is now lobby-
ing for states to adopt and enforce anti-paramilitary statutes like those advocated by the
Anti-Defamation League. See supra note 15; see also KENNETH S. STERN, A FORCE
UPON THE PLAIN: THE AMERICAN MILITIA MOVEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF HATE 127
(1996) (exploring the American militia movement).
21 The most notable effort at the federal level aimed at stopping militias is the Effec-
tive Death Penalty and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995. See H.R. 2768, 104th Cong.
(1995). As originally envisioned, the Act granted the United States' Attorney General
wide latitude to declare certain federal crimes "federal crime[s] of terrorism" if the
Attorney General believed that such crimes were committed in an attempt to "influence
or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion." See H.R. 2768
§ 101(d), (f)(5). These provisions were deleted from the final version signed by the
President, due in part to opposition from groups as diverse as the ACLU and the NRA.
See Brannon P. Denning, Anti-Terrorism Bill Hits Civil Liberties, COM. APPEAL (Mem-
phis), Mar. 10, 1996, at B4, available in 1996 WL 3206999; David Kopel, Terrifying
Terror Legislation?, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at A14, available in 1996 WL
2945818; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Unleashed Federal Power is No Cure for Terrorism,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at B9. Not all of the bill's objectionable provisions, howev-
er, were deleted. Its unfortunate "reforms" of habeas corpus remained. See Robert
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What most people (including.many neomilitia members) fail to appreci-
ate is that not so very long ago service in one's local militia was as much
an expression of civic commitment as voting or serving on a jury.' Fur-
ther, the anti-government bent of many of these neomilitias obscures the
true origins and intended role of the militia.23 Likewise, the role of the mi-
litia in civic life is largely overlooked both by Communitarians'4 and by
those law professors advocating a reevaluation of "civic republicanism."'
Far from attempting to reintroduce the militia into state and local civic life,
the Communitarian platform, drafted by movement founder Amitai Etzioni,
University of Maryland professor of public affairs William Galston, 2 and
Harvard law professor Mary Ann Glendon, calls for domestic disarmament
to counter the "clear and present danger" that it claims guns present to the
health and safety of Americans.27 This Communitarian hostility toward pri-
vate ownership of guns,' as well as a continued unwillingness to acknowl-
edge the -possible utility of reinvigorating state and local militias, is incon-
sistent with the tenets of their philosophy. In fact, it seems evident that
militias embody the very ideal of the Communitarian project and that
Cottrol & Glenn Reynolds, Greasing the Skids at Start of Death Row, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 1996, at A15, available in 1996 WL 2950835.
2 See infra text following note 155.
See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Up in Arms About a Revolting Movement, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 30, 1995, § 1, at 11, available in 1995 WL 616195 (warning against forgetting
militias' necessary connection to state authority); Skinner, supra note 16, at 17-18.
' The substitute most often advocated is community service. See, e.g., WILLIAM F.
BUCKLEY, JR., GRATITUDE: REFLECTIONS ON WHAT WE OWE OUR COUNTRY (1990)
(advocating "voluntary" public service for all high school graduates); Amitai Etzioni,
The New Rugged Communitarianism: Maybe Americans Are Just Too Free, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 1991, at B1 (discussing importance of national service in Communitarian
movement).
' See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Civic Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101.YALE L.J. 551, 610-12 (1991) (advocating national service as a
way to fulfill the role left empty by the decline of the militia); see also Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 1564-65 & n.140 ("In other forms, republican thought is militaristic and hero-
ic .... But efforts to assimilate politics to war will often lead to undesirable directions.
There is also an issue of gender here: the military metaphor traditionally operated to
exclude women."). But see infra note 142 and accompanying text (noting that some
states have amended their militia statutes to include women).
26 William Galston recently served as Deputy Assistant to President Clinton on the
Domestic Policy Council.
27 See infra Part I.B.
See CLINTON, supra note 4, at 133-34; GLENDON, supra note 5, at 43 ("The lan-
guage of the second amendment ... [has] promoted the belief in many quarters that an
absolute, or nearly absolute, individual right was thereby created.... [T]he starkness of
some of the language in the Bill of Rights has helped to legitimate intemperate argu-
ments made by those who have a particular attachment to one of the rights framed in
such terms.").
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Communitarians' reluctance to embrace the militia and to attempt to remake
it as it once was-an essential civic institution--ensures the continuation of
a Gresham's law 9 of guns and militias in which the bad inevitably drives
out the good. Further, the rise of neomilitias represents a dark side of
Communitarianism that its enthusiasts seem unwilling to acknowledge."
The failure of both Communitarians and militia theorists to acknowledge
these issues indicates a great deal about the narrowness of their respective
views regarding both community and arms-bearing. It also indicates some
unfortunate things about the state of constitutional discourse today." This
Essay briefly summarizes the history and viewpoints of the Communitarian
movement-including its express statement that arms-bearing should be
understood in the context of militias-and the surprisingly Communitarian
history of militias themselves. This Essay then suggests solutions to contem-
porary problems involving arms-bearing and militias that are unlikely to
please either mainstream Communitarians or members of neomilitia groups,
but that nonetheless should be considered.
I. THE COMMUNITARIAN MOVEMENT
A. Communitarian First Principles
While influential critiques of liberalism have come in the last few years
from Jean Bethke Elshtain32 and the late Christopher Lasch,33 the driving
force behind Communitarianism is Amitai Etzioni, professor of sociology at
George Washington University. Etzioni envisioned Communitarianism as a
transpartisan political movement bringing together those from various ideo-
logical camps to forge a national community." Etzioni brought together law
professors, philosophers, and other social scientists at a conference in 1990
to formulate principles for this "ideology of the nineties."35 The group
founded a quarterly journal devoted to the promulgation of Communitarian
29 Named for English merchant and financier Sir Thomas Gresham, Gresham's law
is the tendency of the inferior of two forms of currency to circulate more freely than, or
to the exclusion of, the superior, because of the hoarding of the latter. Hence its popular
formulation: "the bad money drives out the good."
30 See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
3' See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
32 See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1995).
33 See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1995).
"' See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 14.
35 gAI
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thinking36 and drew up a platform of principles.37
Communitarianism seeks to change an entire way of thinking about the
citizen's relationship to the government.3" Instead of the us-versus-them
"rights-talk" common to our modern society,39 the Communitarians seek to
encourage the citizen to see her fate as inexorably linked to that of her fel-
low neighbors, coworkers, and citizens at the local, state, and national level.
As Etzioni wrote in his book The Spirit of Community, Communitarians
"adopted the name ... to emphasize that the time had come to attend to our
responsibilities to the conditions and elements we all share, to the communi-
ty."4 With rights, the Communitarians remind us, come responsibilities,
and the latter, they believe, are overlooked in the rush to secure new rights
for increasingly atomized groups of individuals.4" Not only has such radical
individualism taken its toll on the moral fabric of the country,42 with
alarming increases in illegitimacy and divorce,43 but due to "excessive re-
gard" for the institution of private property, things like the environment
have suffered as well."4
Contemporary law already recognizes that everyone's exercise of rights
necessarily requires limits, 45 but this balancing takes place largely in courts
and out of sight of the lay community, thus tending to keep hidden the
application of limits to one's rights.46 Further, despite what goes on in the
courts, our political dialogue of rights tends to be absolute. "Rights-talk,"
then, takes the form of a zero-sum conversation in which, according to
Communitarians, every admission of limits is seen as a surrender.47
Communitarians seek to make plain that the exercise of rights entails the
36 Id. at 16. The journal, The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities,
was first published in January 1991.
37 Id. at 18.
38 Id. at 23-53.
39 GLENDON, supra note 5, at x-xi.
40 ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 15. Conservative enthusiasts tend to use the term "civil
society" instead of the term "Communitarianism"; see, e.g., James Gray Pope, Republi-
can Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 319 (1990).
' See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 5 ("We should, for a transition period of, say, the
next decade, put a tight lid on the manufacturing of new rights."); GLENDON, supra note
5, at xi ("A tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in terms of a clash of
rights ... impedes compromise, mutual understanding, and the discovery of common
ground. A penchant for absolute formulations.., promotes unrealistic expectations and
ignores both social costs and the rights of others."); SANDEL, supra note 5, at 25-28.
42 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 14.
13 See CLINTON, supra note 4, at 39.
" See GLENDON, supra note 5, at 9.
45 Id. at 20.
46 Id. at 42-43.
47 id. at 40-46.
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acceptance of responsibilities and that rights themselves have limits.4
The Communitarian project is an ambitious one; it seeks to change the
way Americans think about their relationship to others. It seeks, in the
words of the Communitarian platform, to "recognize[] both individual hu-
man dignity and the social dimensions of human existence."49 It eschews
simple majoritarianism but emphasizes its support for democratic solutions
to common societal problems. Communitarianism seeks to restore
America's "moral voice"'" through the use of non-governmental social
units through which values have been traditionally transmitted: neighbor-
hoods, churches, families, and the public schools.52  Moreover,
Communitarians advocate direct action at the smallest societal unit capable
of addressing societal problems. Their platform states that
no social task should be assigned to an institution that is
larger than necessary to do the job. What can be done by
families should not be assigned to an intermediate
group---school, etc. What can be done at the local level
should not be passed on to the state or federal level, and so
on.
53
48 Id. at 76-77; ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 4-11.
4' ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 253 (quoting the Communitarian platform). Etzioni
drafted the platform while Mary Ann Glendon and William Galston rewrote it. Id. at
251.
" Id. at 255 ("The success of democratic experiment in ordered liberty (rather than
unlimited license) depends not on fiat or force, but on building shared values, habits
and practices that assure respect for one another's rights and regular fulfillment of per-
sonal, civic, and collective responsibilities."). Likewise, civic republicanism enthusiasts
champion the notion of "dialogue" as a means of achieving consensus. Through dia-
logue, in which no point of view is privileged and in which even "outsider" groups may
participate equally, neorepublicans claim to minimize the dangers inherent in pluralism.
See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1548.
" ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 256.
2 These are termed "intermediate organizations." See Sunstein, supra note 9, at
1574; see also ETzIONI, supra note 1, at 256-59 (emphasizing that rebuilding America's
moral foundations begins with the basic institutions of society). Some family-strength-
ening tools include making workplaces family friendly, see id. at 257, and using the
influence of the community "not to prevent divorce, but to signal society's concern"
about divorce. Id. at 258. Etzioni suggests that schools at all levels should "recognize
and take seriously the grave responsibility to provide moral education." Id. (emphasis
omitted); see also GLENDON, supra note 5, at 109 (describing families, neighborhoods,
religious associations, and other communities as "the seedbeds of civic virtue").
'3 ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 260. Communitarians recognize, however, that certain
tasks demand action on a macro level. Id. (mentioning environmental matters as an
example).
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Further, members of the community ought not hesitate to "speak up and
express our moral concerns to others when it comes to issues we care about
deeply and share with one another."54 In addition, obligations such as that
of community service ought to be institutionalized as a way to inculcate the
young with community ideals as well as offering other members of the com-
munity the opportunity to "foster mutual respect and tolerance" for those
from different backgrounds." Thus, Communitarian first principles encour-
age (1) the use of social, as opposed to necessarily governmental, units to
address social problems at the smallest level possible and (2) the involve-
ment of the largest number of community members possible in transmitting
the community's values to younger generations.
The Communitarian platform also encourages "duties to the polity."56
Those duties include staying informed about matters of concern to the com-
munity;57 voting, so as to ensure that the representatives retain a sufficient
identity of interest with the community's constituent members;" paying
taxes;59 and serving on juries.6" The platform encourages a recognition
that possessing the "right to do X" does not mean that "X is the right
thing ... to do."'" Forbearance both in speech and in actions toward one's
fellow citizens will help foster "social justice," which requires the presence
of "responsible individuals in a responsive community."62 In addition to the
responsibility to their local communities, Communitarian citizens also have
a responsibility to the larger "community"-the polity.63
B. Communitarians and Guns
Because Communitarians realize they cannot rely solely on the good
will of citizens to counter the effects of radical individualism, they call for
narrowed judicial interpretations of rights to take into account the "need to
protect the health and safety of the public."' This includes, among other
things, allowing the community to take action to prevent the spread of
AIDS65 and "domestic disarmament" to protect the community from inten-
54 Id.





60 Id. at 261-62.
61 Id. at 263.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 265-66.
64 Id. at 264.
65 Id.; see also Ronald Bayer & Kathleen E. Toomey, Preventing HIV: Rights, Du-
ties, and Partner Notification, in RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD: THE
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tional or accidental deaths inflicted through the use of firearms.' This em-
powering of the community to take collective action in ways that might
marginalize the dignity of individuals or abrogate certain constitutional
rights (such as domestic disarmament) has given some commentators
pause.67
The Communitarian solution with regard to guns is puzzling, and it is
inconsistent with proposed Communitarian solutions to society's other ills.
Elsewhere in his book, for example, Etzioni indicates that he would rely on
social pressure and community education, what he terms "suasion," as op-
posed to governmental regulation to encourage the responsible exercise of
rights.68 Further, Etzioni emphasizes that the government's power ought to
be used only as a last resort and not merely because the exercise of certain
rights is deleterious to the public.69 Yet the proposed Communitarian solu-
tion to gun violence shows no such restraint. Such a rush to criminalize gun
ownership certainly smacks of the authoritarian approach that Etzioni dis-
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 75, 75-87 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) (urging the
adoption of contact-tracing programs as a method of notifying partners of HIV-infected
ifidividuals).
66 The Communitarian platform states that
[t]here is little sense in gun registration. What we need to significantly enhance
public safety is domestic disarmament of the kind that exists in practically all
democracies. The National Rifle Association suggestion that "criminals not guns
kill people" ignores the fact that thousands are killed each year, many of them
children, from accidental discharge of guns, and that people-whether criminal,
insane, or temporarily carried away by impulse-kill and are much more likely to
do so when armed than when disarmed. The Second Amendment, behind which
NRA hides, is subject to a variety of interpretations, but the Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled, for over a hundred years, that it does not prevent laws that bar
guns. We join with those who read the Second Amendment the way it was written,
as a Communitarian clause, calling for community militias, not individual gun-
slingers.
ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 265.
61 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 801, 811 (1993) ("Civic republicanism is by nature a collectivist political
theory ... . [It] gives primary empirical and ethical significance to collective, rather
than individual human endeavors.").
68 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 39 ("Much of what Communitarians favor has little
to do with laws and regulations, which ultimately draw upon the coercive powers of the
state, but with being active members of a community."); see also id. at 48 ("[T]he law
as a deterrent has its place in any moral order. Morality rests on intricate interactions
among three factors: individual conscience, the moral voice of the community, and the
state. Each one helps to sustain the others. Hence while it is best to build up individual
consciences and community voices, communities must on occasion fall back on the
law.").
69 Id. at 48.
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claims."0 This approach is also inconsistent with the Communitarian plat-
form, which allegedly calls for a "Communitarian" interpretation of the
Second Amendment.71 One will find no plan for implementing such an in-
terpretation in Etzioni's book,72 however, and there is little mention of it in
other Communitarian literature.73 This Essay supplies such an interpreta-
tion, although it is doubtful that the call for such an approach was meant to
be acted upon. Yet, taken seriously, a Communitarian approach to communi-
ty militias raises some interesting questions, especially about
Communitarianism itself.
To support the claim that armed militias might serve to uphold the aims
of Communitarianism, one first needs to realize that arms-bearing and
militias traditionally were not the purview of disaffected fringe elements. On
the contrary, the militias of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the
community. Operating with the imprimatur of state governments, an armed
citizenry was regarded not as a dangerous crowd of gunslingers but as a
necessary precondition to a virtuous republic.
II. MILITIAS AND THE COMMUNITARIAN IDEAL
A. A Brief History of the Milit in the United States
Though largely forgotten, IT 1litias were once an important institution in
America.74 The Constitution, for example, mentions militias in several plac-
es,75 most notably in the Bill o.. Rights.76 James Madison considered the
70 See id. at 255.
71 See id. at 265.
See id. at 139-41 (describing ways of "Enhancing Public Safety the
Communitarian Way," which include neighborhood patrols, sentencing nonviolent of-
fenders to community service, and using public shaming to deter crime, but making no
mention of armed citizen militias).
73 See, e.g., NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS,
AND COMMUNITIES (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995); RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD: THE
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995). Neither book discusses the
application of Communitarian principles to the Second Amendment.
71 See generally JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND NATIONAL GUARD
35-38 (1983); Scott Bursor, Note, Toward a Functional Framework for Interpreting the
Second Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1125, 1131-39 (1996) (describing how an armed
populace historically served important military, political, civil, and moral functions).
71 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (giving Congress power "[t]o provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions"), with id. § 8, cl. 16 (giving Congress power "[t]o provide for organiz-
ing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may
be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress"), and id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be
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militia to be one of the bulwarks of American liberty.77 Madison's senti-
ment was echoed by the famous nineteenth century constitutional commenta-
tors Joseph Story78 and Thomas Cooley.79 But what was the "militia" of
which the Framers wrote? In a nutshell, the Framers' militias were "com-
prised [of] all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense,""° or, in other words, they were "citizens primarily; soldiers on oc-
casion.""
Militias were part of an inherited, English, radical Whig ideology vigor-
ously opposed to "standing armies"-those armies comprised of professional
soldiers-as being inimical to the liberties of the people. 2 The historian
Commander in Chief of... the militia of the several States, when called into the actual
service of the United States ....").
76 See U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.").
77 See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Madi-
son wrote,
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country be formed; and let
it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it would not be going
too far to say that the State governments with the people on their side would be
able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best com-
putation, a standing army can be carried in any country does not exceed one hun-
dredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number
able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army
of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands,
officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common lib-
erties and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and
confidence.
Id. at 301.
78 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 746 (DaCapo Press
1970) (1833). Story wrote that
[t]he militia is the natural defense of a free country against sudden foreign inva-
sions, domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers. It is
against sound policy for a free people to keep up large military establishments
and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expenses, with
which they are attended, and the facile means, which they afford to ambitious and
unprincipled rulers, to subvert the government, or trample upon the rights of the
people.
Id. at 746.
79 See 1 THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 729 (8th ed. 1927) ("The
alternative to a standing army is 'a well-regulated militia'; but this cannot exist unless
the people are trained to bearing arms.").
' United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (describing militias in the con-
text of the Second Amendment).
81 Id.
82 See generally BAILYN, supra note 7, at 62 (quoting the English pamphleteer
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J.G.A. Pocock described the tradition as
a civic and patriot ideal in which the personality was found-
ed in property, perfected in citizenship but perpetually
threatened by corruption; government figuring paradoxically
as the principal source of corruption and operating through
such means as patronage, faction, standing armies (opposed
to the ideal of the militia), established churches (opposed to
the Puritan and deist modes of American religion) and the
promotion of a monied interest .... Not all Americans were
schooled in this tradition, but there was (it would almost
appear) no alternative tradition in which to be schooled.83
Not surprisingly, this Whig tradition, also called republicanism or civic
republicanism,' is an intellectual antecedent of Communitarianism."
Independent militias were sometimes organized prior to the Revolution,
in part as a counterweight to the Tory-controlled regular militias, 6 and
worked closely with the military force of the Continental Army.87 During
the Revolutionary War, these colonial militias performed admirably,88 par-
ticularly when operating close to their home towns and villages, although
they often were disparaged by professional military officers as ill-disciplined
and unsuited for extended campaigning. This clearly illustrates that militias
were primarily intended to be defensive; indeed, those who refused to leave
their homes and towns still played an important role in preventing any coun-
terrevolutionary activity from establishing a foothold. Nevertheless, as Pro-
fessor Robert Cottrol has written, it is important to keep in mind "that the
armed population and the militia were intended to serve more than a simple
military function. They were seen as fulfilling political and perhaps moral
purposes as well."89 This latter point seems lost on most modern critiques
Trenchard as writing that "'unhappy nations have lost the precious jewel liberty ...
[because] their necessities or indiscretion have permitted a standing army to be kept
amongst them"').
83 See J.G.A.' POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 507 (1975).
4 See generally WOOD, supra note 7, at 46-90 (describing the intellectual founda-
tions of republicanism); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth
Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1734 (1989) (contrasting republicanism with liber-
alism).
85 See generally WOOD, supra note 7, at 46-90; Gey, supra note 67, at 804-06.
86 See STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 60 (1984).
87 Id. at 61-63.
88 Id. at 63.
89 GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE
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of the militia as an institution, which seem solely concerned with the
militia's military capabilities, or lack thereof.9
As previously mentioned, 9' the militia was featured prominently in the
text of the Constitution, and heated debates occurred regarding the extent of
federal government control over the state militias.92 In the end, there was a
compromise: 9 the federal government retained the power to call up the
militia and to prescribe its training;94 the states retained the power over the
militia members' actual training and could prescribe the method by which
officers were chosen.95
Initially, Congress took seriously its responsibility toward the militia,96
passing an act in 1792 that detailed uniform standards for the militia of all
SECOND AMENDMENT XXXVI (Robert J. Cott rol ed., 1994). The same observation might
be made about arms-bearing by individuals in general, which was felt to promote virtue
and encourage responsibility. Thomas Jefferson extolled the virtues of guns in a letter to
his nephew:
As to the species of exercise, I advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exer-
cise to the body, it gives boldness, enterprise, and independence to the mind.
Games played with the ball, and others of that nature, are too violent for the
body, and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun, therefore, be the con-
stant.companion of your walks.
1 THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 318 (John P. Foley ed., Russell & Russell 1967) (1900).
See also MCDONALD, supra note 7, at 74 ("Virtue meant manliness, and manliness
meant independence.... [A]nd this independence ... was 'in the last analysis mea-
sured by his ability to bear arms and use them in his own quarrels."') (quoting J.G.A.
Pocock); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749,
771-72 (1994) (discussing the connection between a militia composed of the body of
the people and the meaning of a "republican" government).
See, e.g., Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians
and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 659
(1995) (arguing that "[rieliance upon civilian militias during the Revolution ... proved
to be 'militarily disastrous."') (quoting BRUCE D. PORTER, WAR AND THE RISE OF THE
STATE 249 (1994)). But see Brannon P. Denning, Palladium of Liberty?: Causes and
Consequences of the Federalization of State. Militias in the Twentieth Century, 21
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1997) (noting that although criticized by
professional soldiers, the militias proved adept at inflicting considerable losses on the
British and, due to their close ties with their communities, preventing significant coun-
terrevolutionary activity).
"' See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
9' See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 384-89 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966) (1937).
93 See id. at 387-88.
See id. at 388 (describing the militia clauses of the Constitution).
95 Id.
' See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress 1791-
1793, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 606, 640-44 (1996) (describing the debates over a uniform
militia bill).
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states, down to the number of rounds of ammunition a militiaman was ex-
pected to have on hand. 7 As Hamilton foresaw, 9 by the mid-nineteenth
century, the militia had declined. 99 The federal government came to rely
more on a professional military, and the states simply were unwilling to
shoulder the financial burden of maintaining militias."° Nevertheless, the
militia was still seen as a valuable community institution.'' The decline,
no doubt, accelerated as the United States began to aspire to empire in the
late nineteenth century. National authorities, frustrated by their inability to
send state militias outside the country's boundaries, sought a new organiza-
tion-one that could remain under the nominal control of the states until
such time as it was called into service of the United States."'° In 1909, the
National Guard was born.
' The Militia Act provided:
That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter,
provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two
spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than
twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge
to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack,
shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a
quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutered and provid-
ed, when called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on
company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.
Militia Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (repealed 1903). This represented the major Con-
gressional action regarding the militia until the twentieth century.
98 THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 209-10 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed.,
1987) (arguing that any attempt to "disciplin[e] all of the militia of the United States"
through national musters and compulsory exercises would be regarded as "a real griev-
ance to the people and a serious public inconvenience and loss").
In his influential treatise on the Constitution, Joseph Story editorialized about the
decline of the militias and the attendant dangers accompanying such attitudes:
[T]hough ... the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeni-
able, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing
indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a
sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the
people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is cer-
tainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to con-
tempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of
our national bill of rights.
3 STORY, supra note 78, at 677.
100 Of course, one also might argue that there was a noticeable decline in "civic vir-
tue," with more and more citizens seeking to escape their militia duties as the threat of
invasions and insurrections began to subside. See id. at 746.
1 For example, despite the inexcusable neglect that militias often suffered at the
hands of niggardly state legislatures, many units still performed admirably during the
War of 1812, most notably during the Battle of New Orleans. See Denning, supra note
90 (describing militia successes in the War of 1812).
102 See JOHN K. MAHON, THE WAR OF 1812, at 51 (1972); see also infra Part ll.B.
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B. The National Guard and the Death of the Universal Militia
The Dick Act, °3 passed in 1903, "signified the .. . [end] of the
old,... state-controlled, system"'1°4 by introducing significant federal re-
quirements for the training and equipping of state militias. The National
Defense Act of 19085 followed the Dick Act and authorized the use of
the newly constituted "National Guard" to serve outside the boundaries of
the United States.l°6
Congress passed another national defense act 7 in 1916 as part of gen-
eral preparedness in the face of an escalating European war. Among the in-
creased requirements placed upon the states (and upon the United States
Army, the administrator of the requirements) was an innovative solution to
the constitutional prohibition against the foreign use of militia troops: the
President was authorized to draft state Guard members into national service
as federal reserve troops." 8 Furthermore, the National Defense Act of
1916, which acted as a condition precedent to the states' receipt of federal
funds, forced the states to cede most of whatever control they retained over
the militia, including the constitutional prerogative to appoint officers to
command the militia." As one commentator has noted, "A recurring fact
103 Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (repealed 1956).
104 Patrick Todd Mullins, Note, The Militia Clauses, The National Guard, and Feder-
alism: A Constitutional Tug of War, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 328, 333 (1988) (detailing
the history of the federalization of the militia system and the concomitant erosion of
state control over an ostensibly state institution).
"05 Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 204, 35 Stat. 399 (amending Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch.
196, 32 Stat. 775).
"s Id. at 400. This focus on the military as a means to project the United States'
power worldwide is just the sort of vice that results from the maintenance of a standing
army. Because the militia clauses of the Constitution seem to limit the militia's role to
one of defense, this portion of the act was deemed unconstitutional in a United States
Attorney General's opinion which stated that militias could not be sent to a foreign
country. See Authority of President to Send Militia Into a Foreign Country, 29 Op.
Att'y Gen. 322 (1912).
"o National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (current version in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C. and 32 U.S.C.).
108 See Mullins, supra note 104, at 334. The Supreme Court upheld this constitutional
end-run in Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (holding that the power to
draft members of the National Guard into the U.S. Army and the power to compel
civilians to render military service was granted to the President by the Constitution).
109 Mullins, supra note 104, at 335. The right of the states to appoint their own offi-
cers was an important concession to Antifederalists during the debates. It was thought
that state militia units would be less susceptible to corruption if under federal control
than if units remained under the command of "sons of the state." In modern parlance,
the states' retention of the power to appoint officers ensured that militias would stay
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pattern emerges: the states, faced with ever more demanding standards but
unable to pay for upgrading, are forced to accept both federal funding and
the resulting loss of control that goes along with that funding.""'
This pattern continued into the 1930s with the establishment of a "dual
enlistment policy," whereby each member of a state National Guard unit
simultaneously became a member of the United States National Guard."'
Though militia members retained their status as members of the state Na-
tional Guard, Congress could order them into actual service for the United
States"' whenever it declared a national emergency. During such service,
members lost their status as members of the state'National Guard."
3
In 1952, Congress removed the national emergency requirement as a
prerequisite for federal control of state militias and, instead, authorized fed-
eral control for "training" purposes regardless of the existence of national
emergency." 4 This power was subject to gubernatorial approval, a require-
ment removed in the mid-1980s by a Congressional amendment precipitated
by some governors' refusal to send forces to train in Central America." 5
Thus, in less than a century, state militia systems were dismantled piece-
meal; what remains today is, at best, a "select militia" which, because it
lacks universal membership, would be viewed by the Framers as little better
than a standing army."6 More ominously, the destruction of state militias
removed an important civilian check upon federal military power:
By providing for a militia in the Constitution, the Framers
sought to strengthen civilian control of the military. They
postulated that a militia composed of citizen-soldiers would
curb any unseemly ambitions of the small standing army.
Today's National Guard is often perceived as the successor
rooted in their community.
110 Id. at 334 n.66.
... National Defense Act of 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153, 160.
112 Id. at 161.
113 Id.
114 Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, 66 Stat. 481, 489.
The "Montgomery Amendment" to the National Defense Authorization Act of
1987 provides that "[t]he consent of a Governor... may not be withheld (in whole or
in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its pos-
sessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such
active duty." National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. 99-661, sec. 522,
§ 12301, 100 Stat. 3871 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 12301(f) (1984)). The Supreme Court
found this amendment to be constitutional in Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496
U.S. 334, 337 (1990).
116 See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN AN-
GLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 148 (1994) ("Because of their long-standing prejudice against a
select militia as constituting a form of standing army liable to be skewed politically and
dangerous to liberty, every state had created a general militia.").
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to the militia, and observers still tout the Guard's role as the
ultimate restraint on the professional military.
The reality, however, is much different. Today's National
Guard is a very different force from the colonial-era militia.
With 178,000 full-time federal employees and almost all of
its budget drawn from the federal government, the National
Guard is, for all practical purposes, a federal force.
117
C. Mandatory Militias?
Despite some interest in militias in the early twentieth century18 and
more recently in a few communities around the country,"9 the federal gov-
ernment, and the populace in general, seems uninterested in reestablishing a
universal militia. 2 ° Nevertheless, a Communitarian approach to the Second
Amendment that focuses on the Constitution's militia clauses makes a case
that Congress is obligated to provide the states with the ability to maintain a
militia that the Framers would recognize, rather than merely providing for
the operation of the National Guard.
If one accepts the Communitarian platform's community-oriented ap-
proach,12' it can be argued plausibly that the Second Amendment actually
requires the maintenance of a universal militia. After all, the opening clause
of the Second Amendment begins, "A well regulated Militia, being neces-
sary to the security of a free State .... ,," Thus the Framers considered a
well-regulated militia to be, well, necessary to the security of a free
117 Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 384 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).
1' See generally JOHN GARRY CLIFFORD, THE CITIZEN SOLDIERS: THE PLATISBURG
TRAINING CAMP MOVEMENT, 1913-1920 (1972) (describing early twentieth century
efforts to institute universal military training in the United States).
119 See, e.g., Larry Rohter, County Creates Militia To Defend Gun Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1994, at A14 (describing a unanimous vote of the Santa Rosa County,
Florida County Commission establishing a militia and making every man, woman, and
child in the county eligible for service).
" At most, civic republicans advocate a host of governmental reforms that are sup-
posed to capture the militia spirit. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 25, at 603-04 (listing
alternative "virtue functions" that could be performed by "militia surrogates").
121 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 253-54 (noting that the Communitarian platform
preamble states that "[n]either human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained
for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which we all be-
long").
122 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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state.'23 Add to this straightforward textual language what we know about
the historical background, particularly the Framers' Whiggish hostility to-
ward standing armies," and the idea that the federal government, and per-
haps the states as well, possess an absolute obligation to maintain a univer-
sal militia seems reasonably well-founded. This intent is evident in light of
the 1792 Militia Act,"z which is entirely consistent with this understand-
ing.
Of course, such a duty could be meaningless in practice. Similar obliga-
tions of the federal government, after all, have largely been interpreted out
of existence. The Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4," for example,
was the subject of judicial near-abnegation, 27 with its goal being achieved,
if at all, by such other provisions as the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause. In general, courts are far more willing to entertain claims
based on individual rights than on government obligation."
In this light, the Second Amendment could be understood as an example
of very careful drafting indeed: a government obligation (to maintain a
militia) coupled with an individual right (to keep and bear arms) that en-
sures that the key element of a universal militia (an armed citizenry) cannot
be extinguished by government neglect. 29 At the very least, the clear con-
stitutional statement regarding the necessity of a well-regulated (universal)
militia for the security of a free state should give us pause. The logical
consequence of this statement is that a state lacking such a militia is either
insecure or unfree 3° In light of what is known about the purposes of the
See Dunlap, supra note 117, at 384-85.
14 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
125 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed 1903).
126 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
127 Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the "United States shall
guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican Form of Government." This provi-
sion is regarded as essentially meaningless by most lawyers today, but there is no doubt
that the Framers intended it to grant the national government power to act in the event
that a state government became tyrannical. It is generally poor lawyering to argue that
any part of the Constitution lacks meaning, and there is no basis for such an assertion
in the context of the Guaranty Clause. The case generally cited for the proposition that
the Guaranty Clause is a nullity is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). That case, how-
ever, merely stated that the clause is not susceptible to direct judicial enforcement,
something made clear later in Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912). Such a holding is not at all inconsistent with the notion that the federal govern-
ment lacks power under the Guaranty Clause. It merely indicates that such power is
held in the first instance by Congress or the Executive branch, not by the judiciary.
" See generally SANDEL, supra note 5, at 25-54 (noting that the Supreme Court
views protecting individual rights as a priority).
129 See COOLEY, supra note 79, at 729.
130 See William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1243-44 (1994). Van Alstyne writes that
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Second Amendment and the Framers' views regarding standing armies and
armed citizens, an interpretation of the first clause of the Second Amend-
ment as requiring universal militias seems well-founded. It is certainly better
grounded in the Constitution's text, history, and purposes than many other
constitutional arguments that have attained general acceptance.'
Nor is that the only consequence. Accepting, arguendo, that a court
lacks the power to order the creation of a universal militia, the absence of
such a militia could still have legal (and political) consequences. One can
imagine the following exchange between a government representative and a
member of one of today's neomilitias:
GOVERNMENT: You have no right to operate a private militia. The only
militia recognized under the Second Amendment is a
state-sponsored militia. Private groups have no stand-
ing. 32
MILITIAMAN: A state-sponsored militia, eh? Which one is that?
GOVERNMENT: The National Guard, of course.
31
MILITIAMAN: Don't be silly. The National Guard is not universal, and
it isn't state-controlled. At best, it's a select militia of the
sort that the Framers disliked."3
the Second Amendment adheres to the guarantee of the right of the people to
keep and bear arms as the predicate for the other provision to which it speaks,
i.e., the provision respecting a militia, as distinct from a standing army separately
subject to congressional regulation and control. Specifically, it looks to an ulti-
mate reliance on the common citizen who has a right to keep and bear arms rath-
er than only to some standing army, or only to some other politically separated,
defined, and detached armed cadre, as an essential source of security of a free
state.... [The Second Amendment] expressly embraces that right and indeed it
erects the very scaffolding of a free state upon that guarantee. It derives its defini-
tion of a well-regulated militia in just this way for a "free State": The militia to
be well-regulated is a militia to be drawn from just such people (i.e., people with
a right to keep and bear arms) rather than from some other source (i.e., from
people without rights to keep and bear arms).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
"' Id. at 1255.
132 For arguments in support of this position, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 488-96 (1995) (describing the
"States' Right Model" of the Second Amendment).
133 See, e.g., Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 36-
38 (1989) (discussing the creation of the National Guard as an organized form of the
militia).
134 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
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Oh, all right. The truth is, we allowed the real militia to
die. It wasn't good for much. We couldn't even use it to
invade Mexico or Canada. Furthermore, the professional
military didn't like it.
135
Fine. Because you admit you've defaulted on a constitu-
tional obligation that is "necessary to the security of a
free state," we've resorted to self-help. We'd rather see a
universal militia of the sort the Framers envisioned, but
only the government can create that. We've done the best
we could in light of your default. And you should be
estopped from complaining, until you have lived up to
your constitutional obligation.'36
But private militias are dangerous. They don't necessari-
ly represent the whole community; only portions of the
community join such groups. They are prone to being
infiltrated by malcontents, and they scare people.'37
All true. That's why we should have a universal militia.
Too bad you guys have fallen down on the job.
Despite its half-whimsical treatment here, the argument is a serious one.
1131, 1166 (1991):
Nowadays, it is quite common to speak loosely of the National Guard as "the
state militia," but 200 years ago, any band of paid, semiprofessional, part-time
volunteers, like today's Guard, would have been called "a select corps" or "select
militia"-and viewed in many quarters as little better than a standing army. In
1789, when used without any qualifying adjective, "the militia" referred to all
Citizens capable of bearing arms.... [Thus,] the "militia" is identical to "the
people .... "
Id. (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
135 Or as David Williams opined,
Those who support a states' rights view of the militia seek to identify the
Amendment's militia with the National Guard. The Guard, however, is a select
body, only a fraction of the population.... The universal militia, by contrast, was
the people under another name; it could not turn against the people because it was
the people. As the National Guard is not universal, it cannot serve as a substitute.
Williams, supra note 25, at 589 (footnotes omitted); see also William S. Fields & Da-
vid T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2
(1992) (suggesting that the National Guard should be considered "troops" raised with
the consent of Congress under Article I, Section 10, rather than a "militia").
136 See Denning, supra note 90.
131 See Williams, supra note 25, at 553-54 (describing civilian militias and their rela-
tionship to the Second Amendment as "terrifying").
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If a well-regulated militia of the sort the Framers envisioned is as important
as a Communitarian interpretation of the Second Amendment suggests, then
there is a constitutional argument for self-help in the event of a government
default. Such an argument would likely fail in court, but that does not nec-
essarily diminish its political, or even its constitutional, force. The easy
solution is to take seriously the Second Amendment's first clause. Doing so,
however, is likely to pose problems for the Communitarians' stated goal of
domestic disarmament.
D. The Communitarian Militia
Critics will no doubt label militias as quaint anachronisms, unsuited for
either modern military service 3' or local law enforcement,'39 activities
viewed as best left to "professionals," though the recent record of some law
enforcement professionals should give one pause. 4 Despite what critics
say, states continue to take their militias semi-seriously: almost every state
in the nation has a statute that designates the citizenry of a- specified age as
the "unorganized militia" of the state. 4 ' Many states even have updated
their unorganized militia statutes in recent years to include women.' Al-
though geopolitical realities probably preclude reliance on the militia as the
keystone of our military strategy, this is not a flaw of militias; rather, it
speaks to the role the United States has assumed in world affairs, a role the
Framers had not likely intended. Using a militia to service the security
needs of states and communities, on the other hand, makes good sense'43
138 This argument was made in the 1940s. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia
Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARv. L. REV. 181, 189-93 (1940).
139 See MALCOLM, supra note 116, at 2-3 (describing the duties of medieval English
citizens to patrol their towns and villages and to pursue criminals).
14 See, e.g., Jeremy Pearce, Drugs and Big Money Tempt Cops Across the Country,
DET. NEWS, May 3, 1996, at A7, available in 1996 WL 2917542; Graham Rayman,
More Allegations of Bad Cops, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 15, 1996, at A24,
available in 1996 WL 2533174.
141 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; IOWA CONST. art. VI, § 1; MISS. CONST.
art. IX, § 214; N.M. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 1, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 16; OHIO CONST.
art. IX, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. XV, § 1; UTAH CONST. art.
XV, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; ALA. CODE § 31-2-2 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 12-61-10 1(b) (Michie 1994); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 122 (West 1994); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 27-1 (1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3(d) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 46-102
(1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-2-3-1 (Michie 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-904(e)
(1993); KY. CONST. § 219 (1993);. MINN. STAT. § 190.06 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-2-2(B) (Michie 1994); N.Y. MIL. LAW § 2(2) (McKinney 1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 33-2-2 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-1.04(d) (Michie 1994); WYO.
STAT. § 19-2-102(a) (1994).
142 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 46-105 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-904(e) (1994);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-1-3 (1994).
143 This is particularly true in light of the rather appalling string of pronouncements
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and can be done in a way that constitutes a perfect fit with Communitarian
principles.
In the eighteenth century, universality was viewed as the great virtue of
militias.'" The militia was seen as incorruptible and thus incapable of tyr-
anny because the diversity of membership was thought to be a powerful
guard against any one element in a community gaining sway over the
whole.14 Militia service brought together community members from varied
backgrounds. 4 6 (Communitarian reticence about acknowledging the virtues
of militias is especially puzzling given the strong, community-centered and
self-reliant elements in the Communitarian platform.147) Further, if cultivat-
ed, the militia could reinforce the idea of duty to the polity in the deepest
sense by obligating members to take up arms for the community's defense
and by accepting responsibility for the safety of residents and visitors. 4 A
from state courts which conclude that because local police departments have a duty to
protect everyone generally, they are responsible for protecting no one in particular. See,
e.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C. 1981) ("[A] fundamental
principle [of American law is] that a government and its agents are under no general
duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any particular individual
citizen."). Any attempted restoration of "collective responsibility" or a community's
"moral voice" is likely doomed to failure if the community members will not come to
one another's aid even when there is little risk of harm to the rescuer.
14 See Williams, supra note 25, at 577-79.
145 Id.
146 See id. at 580. Williams writes,
[Militia m]embership was service to the state that always disrupted one's chosen
round of activities and often involved hunger, cold, disease, and danger. The mili-
tia member was expected to bear these burdens with the knowledge that he was
keeping the republic safe. The experience of working together with fellow citizens
could cement this perspective of self-sacrifice to the common good. Militia ser-
vice required cooperation among citizens and subordination to orders, [and] stim-
ulated a commitment to comrades that would become a devotion to the public that
they represented ....
Id. (footnotes omitted). Similarly, the late novelist Andrew Lytle described a typical
militia muster in his novel, The Long Night. Lytle emphasized that such an assembly
brought together those from all socio-economic classes. ANDREW LYTLE, THE LONG
NIGHT 23 (1936); see infra note 159 and accompanying text. Cf. ETZIONI, supra note 1,
at 114. Etzioni describes a mandatory year of national service for high school graduates
as
an important community builder because it would act as a grand sociological
mixer.... A year of national service, especially if it was designed to enable
people from different geographical and sociological backgrounds to work and live
together, could be an effective way for boys and girls, whites and nonwhites,
people from parochial and public schools, north and south, the city and the coun-
try, to come together constructively while working together at a common task.
Id.
147 See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also MALCOLM, supra note 116,
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reconstituted militia serving individual communities under the aegis of the
state also would accomplish the Communitarian goal of resolving problems
by use of the smallest possible societal unit.'49
More importantly, the existence of a citizen militia responsible in some
way for the security of a given community also might reintroduce responsi-
bility into the administration of law enforcement. Although law enforcement
officials formerly were liable, for example, in trespass for improperly serv-
ing a search warrant or for breaking into the wrong house to make an arrest,
legal fictions such as sovereign immunity and qualified immunity now pres-
ent almost insuperable barriers for citizens wishing to hold law enforcement
officers accountable for mistakes or abuses. 5° Further, the recent phe-
nomenon of the "militarization" of law enforcement at all levels of govern-
ment evokes sinister analogies to authoritarian regimes and the much feared
"midnight knock at the door.' 515 Professional law enforcement officers
clad in Nomex coveralls and face shields, after all, hardly seem to represent
the community even in their own minds, much less in the minds of many
onlookers. Encouraging communities to take responsibility for their security
might also have the effect of making those charged with law enforcement
duties morally responsible to their friends and neighbors, and thus help them
exercise greater care and restraint in carrying out their law enforcement
duties. Though many might raise the specter of vigilantism and argue for
respecting the domain of law enforcement professionals,' the recent be-
havior of some law enforcement agencies implies that a "professional" re-
cord is not always something to which communities should aspire.' Like-
wise, charging members of a community with its security will sensitize them
to the link between rights and responsibilities. Moreover, requiring that com-
munity members police the "rights-responsibilities" boundary will highlight
the social cost that accompanies the exercise of rights in a diverse and plural
community."'
at 2-3 (noting that from the early Middle Ages in England, "the law made residents of a
parish liable for compensating a victim of a robbery or riot committed in their parish
for half of his loss").
149 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
130 See generally Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the
Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 158 (discussing the
qualified immunity defense).
151 See Military Police, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 3, 1995, at N12, available in 1995 WL
10049369; Jim Nesbitt, Under Fire: If Police Departments View Themselves as an Ar-
my, Who Is the Enemy?, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), May 28, 1995, at
G1, available in 1995 WL 5064837.
152 See Crossing the Line: Patriots and the Militias, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 4,
1996, at B6, available in 1996 WL 7719447.
"' See Pearce, supra note 140, at A7; Rayman, supra note 140, at A24.
154 See GLENDON, supra note 5, at 1-17.
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A universal militia also would take advantage of some important char-
acteristics of human psychology.' At the risk of sounding too flip, if
militias are outlawed, only outlaws will join militias. Conversely, the es-
tablishment of a government-sponsored universal militia would produce a
very different dynamic. Rather than a way to rebel against the status quo,
militia service would be a means of community service, similar to jury duty.
As with jury duty, those lacking community spirit would probably devote
their energies to finding ways of avoiding service. A universal militia of a
very different character than the private groups extant today possess-a
character far closer to what the Framers envisioned would result.
Similarly, mandatory training in the use of arms in connection with
militia service similarly would further important Communitarian goals. It
could teach forbearance, illustrating that the right to keep and bear arms
does not give one the right to be a "gunslinger." At the same time, arms
education also would address one of the "clear and present dangers" to the
public health cited in the Communitarian platform: deaths caused by acci-
dental gunshot wounds. 156 A return to the Framers' universal militia, then,
would obviate the need for "domestic disarmament" by eliminating the
platform's reason for it. In addition, it would provide a meaningful
Communitarian interpretation of the Second Amendment, just as the
Communitarian platform commands.157
One thing should be obvious from this discussion: in principle, it is
possible to have "community militias" composed of all law-abiding citizens
or to have domestic disarmament, but not both, as the Communitarian plat-
form demands. If all law-abiding citizens belong to the universal militia,
then they will be armed; that is what belonging to a militia means, as the
Supreme Court made clear in United States v. Miller.5 The platform does
not address this contradiction, and the other Communitarian discussion of
guns is so unrelentingly hostile to gun ownership by individuals that it is
difficult to believe Communitarians take seriously their own beliefs in this
context. As the following discussion demonstrates, that is unfortunate.
III. TAKING COMMUNITARIANISM SERIOUSLY
Nothing captures the spirit of community present in militias quite like
the following passage from the late novelist Andrew Lytle's The Long
Night: a
You're too young to remember militia musters, but in my
See Williams, supra note 25, at 563.
156 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 265.
"" See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
158 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939); see supra note 80 (discussing Miller).
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boyhood they were mighty fine gatherings. It was one of
those days, I remember, when a man didn't care what hap-
pened so long as he could feel his strength or try his skill.
It wasn't long until riders from every section of the
county came in, some of the younger and more spirited men
shouting and taking on. But you'd see sober gentlemen of
middle years, sitting straight in their saddles, ride by in a
running walk as if they rode to musters every day. Those too
poor to own stock, although there were not many of this
condition, straggled in on foot.... Kin would meet that
hadn't seen one another for a year or more; and the women
would hardly run through the ailments of children and ser-
vants, with just a running start on the marriages and baptiz-
ing, when the musters came to an end. Such jollification you
never saw. There were dinners on the ground, and red-mouth
barbecue pits. The groceries knocked out the tops of their
liquor barrels, and red whisky ran down gullets like rain
after a dry spell.'59
Today we hear a great deal of yearning for the sort of community spirit
that Lytle describes. At one time, militia service instilled the virtues of self-
sacrifice and self-control, taught the safe use of arms, deterred both tyranny
and invasion, and brought members of various social groups together for
socialization, 6 ' all while providing a socially constructive outlet for
citizens' martial impulses. One would expect Communitarians to endorse
wholeheartedly such an institution, but such an endorsement is conspicuous-
ly absent.
Although there is probably little more enthusiasm outside
Communitarian ranks for the reconstitution of a universal militia, the un-
willingness of Communitarians to entertain the idea makes one a bit suspi-
cious of their whole enterprise. Why does community begin and end only
with (disarmed) community service, responsibility, and forbearance? If irre-
sponsible use of weapons in our communities is a great problem (as it no
doubt is), why rush to disarm everyone instead of creating an outlet through
which responsible right-to-keep-and-bear-arms values might be transmitted?
After all, in response to the problem of fatalities caused by drunk drivers,
159 LYTLE, supra note 146, at 23. Lytle's narrative continues with descriptions of
speech making, wrestling, and other games of strength, followed by a fight, though as
Lytle's narrator puts it: "One or two men were cut up right smart, but nobody got in-
volved in a killing. Men settled their disputes in those days with their fists." Id. at 24.
"6 See Williams, supra note 25, at 577-80.
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Etzioni merely argues that sobriety checkpoints are reasonable 616-he does
not advocate the criminalization of alcohol or the banning of automobiles.
When it comes to a community's responsibility for defending home or prop-
erty, possibly through violence, one notes a deafening silence; although the
platform advocates a "Communitarian" interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment, there is no hint of how that should be effected, and the platform itself
includes an obvious contradiction on the subject. One would expect that a
Communitarian ideal would demand community-related virtues such as
intellectual honesty and a self-critical stance toward one's own predilections.
As our analysis indicates, the Communitarians' treatment .of this issue lacks
at least one of those virtues.
This omission in Communitarian analysis underscores a key flaw. It is
impossible to read the Communitarian literature without suspecting that the
"community" envisioned by most Communitarians looks much like Ann Ar-
bor, Michigan; Charlottesville, Virginia; or Cambridge, Massachusetts: com-
munities with a disproportionate number of Volvos and Montessori schools.
There is nothing wrong with such communities; they are nice places to live.
It is a mistake, however, to think that the community values of Ann Arbor,
for example, are the only ones that matter, or should matter. America pos-
sesses many communities where pickup trucks are more common than
Volvos and where community members believe in values that
Communitarians find unimportant, such as independence and the responsible
use of arms.'62 Some of these communities have responded to the Etzionis
of the world, who they believe do not appreciate their values, by organizing
their own militias ("neomilitias"). The rise of such groups indicates the way
in which elite constitutional opinion has failed to mesh with, or even ac-
knowledge, the deeply felt sentiments of many Americans.'63 As we have
seen, the dismissive attitudes that many elite commentators display toward
such sentiments mask what should be, cultural differences aside, a surprising
degree of common ground."6
Indeed, the common ground goes even farther. The rise of private
"militias" can be seen as the dark side of community and
Communitarianism. Already there are signs that in a few areas in which
militia groups are active, some have attempted to constitute a law unto
themselves," recognizing no authority but their own and cloaking their usurpa-
161 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 170-73.
162 See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 16, at 18.
163 See LASCH, supra note 33, at 25-49.
164 See ETZIONI, supra note 1, at 134-47 (discussing Communitarian principles of
strengthening institutions, personal responsibility, self-help, and social justice).
161 See Corn, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that "many militiamen have turned their
energies toward setting up so-called common law courts ... over whom the federal
government has no authority").
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tion in high-sounding rhetoric about illegitimacy and tyranny.166
History is rife with private community groups which, with the tacit support
of government, seek to impose their will on disfavored members of a com-
munity. 67 These "intermediate organizations" are often even more sinister
when they are armed. Although many Communitarians have failed to ad-
dress this issue, "Neorepublican" theorists in legal academia have acknowl-
edged that the power of these intermediate organizations that
Communitarianism or republicanism is supposed to encourage must be sub-
ject to some regulation. Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, notes the
importance of government not completely surrendering important responsi-
bilities to private organizations.'68 At the same time, however, Sunstein
believes that despite the potential for abuse that exists with the emergence
of intermediate institutions, the answer is not simply for the government to
attempt to eliminate them. To the contrary, Sunstein writes that
"[g]overnment must therefore play a role in limiting the power of such
organizations without denying the importance of their continued exis-
tence." '169 The classical universal militia, of course, was designed to play
just such a" role, yet it receives no credit in Communitarian writings.
That is unfortunate. The more that Communitarians and other members
of the elite stigmatize gun-ownership and call for vigorous prosecution of
gun owners and neomilitia members, the more extremists will be attracted to
both. Moreover, given that seventy-five percent of Americans believe the
Constitution protects the right to keep and bear arms, 170 attempts to
demonize gun ownership and calls for "domestic disarmament" in the name
of "community," or some equally amorphous collective ideal, could result in
166 See Williams, supra note 25, at 582.
167 See Joelle E. Polesky, The Rise of Private Militia: A First and Second Amendment
Analysis of the Right to Organize and the Right to Train, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1604 (1996).
161 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1574. Sunstein writes that
intermediate organizations serve a variety of important functions, but recognition
of that point does not eliminate the need to describe the appropriate role of the
state and national governments.
An approach that sees the locus of republican virtues exclusively in private
institutions undervalues the distinctive capacities of the state. In view of those




170 According to a poll taken in the spring of 1995, most Americans believe citizens
possess such a right. In that poll, respondents were asked, "Do you agree that the Con-
stitution guarantees you the right to own a gun?" Seventy-five percent of those polled
agreed; only 18% disagreed. See The Fight to Bear Arms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT, May 22, 1995, at 29.
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a loss of legitimacy that would pose a much greater threat to communities in
the long run. Similarly, considering the prominence given the militia in the
Constitution and in its underlying ideology, and the failure to maintain the
institution as the country has developed, it is not surprising that intermediate
institutions have arisen to fill the vacuum left by the demise of the tradition-
al militia. Here too, it seems that should a government adhering to
Communitarian principles wish to control the power of the neomilitias, it
has the concomitant responsibility to establish an alternative structure into
which might be channelled the militia-like impulses of its citizens.
It is possible that community might somehow be achieved through Habi-
tat-for-Humanity style group projects, extensive discourse, and the creation
of conditions necessary for "social justice. ' 71 As the community gets larg-
er, however, and as the powers the "community" exercises are granted to
bodies increasingly remote from those for whose benefit the powers are
supposed to be exercised, our antennae ought to be set aquiver. The twenti-
eth century surely has taught that more long term destruction has been com-
mitted in the name of the "community" than by "radical individualists."
According to Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck,
in this century, "the number of people killed by their own governments
under authoritarian regimes is four times the 'number killed in all this
century's wars combined." ' As writer Hannah Arendt reminds us, "It was
not out of a desire for freedom that people eventually demanded their share
in government or admission to the political realm, but out of mistrust in
those who held the power over their life and goods."'73 Advocates of
Communitarianism, whose numbers (judging from the number of new
books) seem to be growing, would do well to consider the logical implica-
tions of their newfound "third way" and consider whether their position on
the Second Amendment dictates that the cartridge box be restored, along
with the ballot box and the jury box, as a hallmark of civic responsibility
and a vehicle for the transmission of civic virtue. If they are not willing to
consider this implication of their thinking, perhaps we should not take them
very seriously in the future.
Alas, however, the failure to consider seriously the implications of their
own positions is hardly a monopoly of the Communitarians. For example,
Judge Robert Bork and other right-wing constitutional scholars have fa-
mously failed to consider that the very constitutional theories they champion
171 The backlash to Communitarianism and neorepublicanism is building. See James
A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of
Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996); Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43
DUKE L.J. 989 (1994).
17 Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE
L.J. 995, 1025-26 n.141 (1995) (quoting Shattuck).
173 HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 150 (Penguin Books 1993)
(1961).
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must sometimes lead to results they abhor.14 Nor are the Communitarians
the only ones to practice such one-eyed constitutional interpretation with
regard to the Second Amendment. 7 Although a certain amount of excess
enthusiasm for one's own arguments is only human, academics should rise
above such sentiments to the extent possible. As a movement started by
academics, and as one that celebrates forbearance and the subordination of
self-gratification for the good of the community, Communitarianism should
be relatively free from such sins. The fact that it is not free suggests that
honest, self-critical constitutional scholarship must be a very difficult thing
indeed.
That is unfortunate, because constitutional scholarship is important, and
honest constitutional scholarship plays, or should play, an important role in
our society as a check on the actions of judges and politicians. Faithful
interpretation of the Constitution is difficult, and, if done honestly and con-
sistently, it is certain to generate at least some answers that the interpreter
does not like. Thus, we should be suspicious of those whose constitutional
theories generate only answers they find congenial, regardless of their ideo-
logical stripe. Unfortunately, constitutional scholarship that passes this test
appears to be in short supply.
We have no solution to this problem beyond that offered by the
Communitarians: suasion. We hope that as a result of our criticisms, and, no
doubt, those of others, the Communitarians will revisit their views on this
issue and at least consider that their own approach, if taken seriously, may
produce answers other than the "domestic disarmament" they so clearly
desire. In this much, at least, we agree with the Communitarians: dialogue is
important. We hope that our contribution to the debate will promote more
thinking about both Communitarianism and the Second Amendment.
174 See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1333 (1992) (criticizing right-wing attacks on Griswold v. Connecticut as inconsis-
tent with original understanding); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence:
Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV.
1045 (1990) (same).
175 See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Inter-
pretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV.
961 (1996) (criticizing lower courts for misinterpreting Miller because of the disapprov-
al of the Second Amendment in general); Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The
Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1737 (1995) (discussing how a states' rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment leads to a result that supporters of such an interpretation dislike).
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